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I. Introduction 
For the fourth time, Fortune Magazine named Google the 
best company to work for in the United States.1 One can easily 
understand why—the benefits are unparalleled. In California, a 
day in the life of a “Googler” begins by taking Google’s free 
shuttle from San Francisco to the Mountain View campus.2 She 
can start the day with a free fitness class before getting a 
complimentary cappuccino on the way to the office.3 The company 
also provides a concierge service to handle everyday tasks.4 The 
concierge can arrange anything from onsite dry cleaning to 
haircuts or bike repairs.5 During downtime, an employee can go 
bowling at the campus lanes, receive a massage, or take a dance 
class.6 All of these benefits are free.7 The company even has 
expansive mortality benefits if an employee passes away—each 
child of a deceased employee receives $1,000 per month until he 
reaches nineteen.8  
                                                                                                     
 1. See 100 Best Companies to Work For, FORTUNE (Jan. 3, 2013, 8:43 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/best-companies/?iid=bc_lp_header (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (ranking companies based on an extensive employee 
survey) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Kevin Smith, Google Employees Reveal Their Favorite Perks 
Working for the Company, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:02 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-employee-favorite-perks-2013-3?op=1 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (listing a variety of employee reactions to the many 
perks that Google offers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. See Meghan Casserly, Here’s What Happens to Google Employees When 
They Die, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
meghancasserly/2012/08/08/heres-what-happens-to-google-employees-when-they-
die/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (discussing Google’s death benefit plan, which 
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Most strikingly, however, Google provides unlimited meals 
and snacks to its employees.9 While many companies provide food 
to their employees in some form, like free coffee and doughnuts 
for example, Google and other Silicon Valley tech companies 
separate themselves by their meal plans’ level of extravagance.10 
Google runs twenty-five cafes at its Mountain View, California 
headquarters,11 and serves over 50,000 meals per day at its 120 
cafes around the world.12 The meals are lavish—fresh sushi at 
Asian-themed Cafe Gia or organic produce from Cafe 150, a 
restaurant using only local ingredients found within 150 miles of 
Mountain View.13 Google employees even coined the phrase “the 
Google fifteen” for the weight gain new employees experience 
when they have access to unlimited, gourmet food.14  
Although Google does not disclose the financial impact of its 
cafe operations, outside estimates suggest a significant 
expenditure.15 One source puts the cost around twenty dollars per 
                                                                                                     
also vests all stock and grants fifty percent of the employee’s salary each year to 
the employee’s surviving spouse for ten years) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 9. See Smith, supra note 2 (quoting a former employee who stated that 
workers are never more than 150 feet away from a cafe or micro kitchen).  
 10. See Mark Maremont, Silicon Valley’s Mouthwatering Tax Break, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000 
1424127887324050304578408461566171752 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) 
(“Although some employers long have been providing free lunches for their 
executives or even ordinary workers, Silicon Valley has taken the practice to a 
new level.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 11. See J.P. Mangalindan, Google: The King of Perks, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 
2012, 3:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/technology/1201/gallery. 
best-companies-google-perks.fortune/4.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating 
that Google increased its number of cafes from eleven to twenty-five) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 12. Maremont, supra note 10.  
 13. See Mangalindan, supra note 11 (describing these free food options as 
making Google “legendary” for its meal options).  
 14. See Meghan Keneally, Noisy Massage Chairs, Over-Inflated Egos and 
Too Much Free Food, It’s a Hard Life at Google: Employees Take to Web to Gripe 
About Their Job Perks, DAILY MAIL (June 19, 2013, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2487276/Former-Google-employees-com 
plain-job-perks.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating that some employees 
use corporate gym facilities to prevent the weight gain) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 15. See Vasanth Sridharan, Google’s Ginormous Free Food Budget: $7,530 
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employee each day, which tallies out to approximately $72 million 
per year.16 Another source believes Google pays closer to ten 
dollars per employee each day.17 Depending on the calculation, it 
appears each employee receives between $4,000 to $8,000 in free 
food each year.18 Yet Google does not report this benefit as 
taxable compensation to its employees.19 Hence, the employees 
presumably pay no taxes on this considerable perk.20  
Other Silicon Valley companies follow Google’s lead and 
provide free meals.21 Facebook has several options for its 
employees, including two gourmet cafes in addition to barbeque, 
pizza, burrito, and burger restaurants.22 Zynga, the social gaming 
tech company, now retains a thirty-three-member culinary staff 
that feeds 1,200 employees meals such as chicken vindaloo, beef 
tenderloin, and lobster mushroom bisque.23 Some caterers in the 
Bay Area call the food boom the “Google Effect,” where even 
nontech companies are beginning to offer free food to compete for 
                                                                                                     
Per Googler, $72 Million a Year*, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2008, 2:36 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/4/googles-ginormous-food-budget-7530-
per-googler (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (making an estimate about the meal 
plan’s cost) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 16. See id. (admitting that originally this estimate was for Google’s 
American operations only but later recalculating and believing that the 
worldwide total is close to this number).  
 17. Maremont, supra note 10.  
 18. See id. (“Assuming a fair-market value of between $8 and $10 per meal, 
a Googler chowing down two squares a day could get dinged for taxes on an 
extra $4,000 to $5,000 a year.”); Sridharan, supra note 15 (estimating the cost 
per employee at $5,000 to $7,530).  
 19. See Maremont, supra note 10 (reporting that former Google employees 
have said Google does not include meal value on paystubs or W-2 tax 
statements).  
 20. See id. (finding no evidence the employees pay tax).  
 21. See id. (naming Facebook, Twitter, Zynga, and Yahoo as providers of 
free employee meals).  
 22. See id. (noting that Facebook’s Cafe Epic offers from morning until 
night dishes like she-crab soup and grilled steak with chimichurri sauce).  
 23. See Yukari Iwatani Kane, The Tech World’s Hottest Meal Ticket, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000 
1424052748703886904576031650379762720 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) 
(describing Zynga Culinary as “one of the hottest food scenes” in San Francisco) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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talent.24 One example of the Google Effect is Yahoo!, whose new 
Chief Executive Officer Marissa Mayer formerly worked at 
Google and brought the free meal practice over to her new 
company.25 Mayer even went as far as to say that Yahoo! 
instituted a Google-like plan to make it “the absolute best place to 
work.”26 Even small startups outside the Bay Area have begun 
providing free meals to meet this new industry standard.27 Yet, as 
of now, none of these companies or their employees treats the 
meal benefit as taxable income.28 In this way, these companies 
have effectively created a lavish form of tax-exempt 
compensation.29  
This practice has sparked debate in the legal community over 
whether these meals should constitute taxable income.30 On one 
side of the debate, some argue that Google, Facebook, and the 
other Silicon Valley companies have these meals for a primarily 
compensatory purpose as a means of attracting the best talent.31 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Shira Ovide, Work Perk: Free-Meal Rule Widens, WALL ST. J. (July 
11, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702 
304022004577516912524877338 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (quoting a caterer 
stating that free food “has become the norm”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 25. See Maremont, supra note 10 (relaying some of Mayer’s comments 
about bringing the food perk to Yahoo!).  
 26. Id.  
 27. See, e.g., Molly Young, The Calorie-Packed Perk, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/fashion/the-calorie-packed-perk.html 
?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing the benefits 
arms race for skilled start-up labor in New York) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See, e.g., Maremont, supra note 10 (stating former Google employees 
reported not paying taxes on their free meals). Google, other large companies, 
and the IRS have declined to comment on the tax status of the food programs. 
Id. Theoretically, these companies could pay the taxes for their employees. This 
is unlikely because those tax payments would also constitute additional 
compensation, and the taxpayer would still need to include it on a tax return. 
See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (finding tax 
payments that a company provided for its officers still constituted income).  
 29. See, e.g., Maremont, supra note 10 (describing the meals as a 
“mouthwatering tax break”).  
 30. See, e.g., id. (describing lawyers’ disagreement on whether the IRS 
should make the companies pay taxes on the meals). 
 31. See id. (quoting statements of Martin J. McMahon, Jr., a tax law 
professor at the University of Florida, who believes the meals represent taxable 
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On the other side, some believe that the meals do not have a 
primarily compensatory purpose but rather help the employers by 
establishing more social interactions that aid innovation and 
encourage employees to spend more time at work.32  
This Note examines the tax treatment of free employee meals 
under programs provided by Google and companies that emulate 
its practices, concluding that the fringe benefit is indeed 
taxable.33 First, the Note provides a context for fringe-benefit 
taxation as a part of gross income.34 Second, the discussion 
identifies two relevant exclusions that could potentially apply to 
the meals—de minimis fringe benefits and the convenience-of-
the-employer doctrine.35 Third, after sorting through statutes, 
regulations, and judicial decisions, this Note argues that the free 
meal practices constitute taxable compensation.36 It demonstrates 
that the Silicon Valley companies cannot meet the burden of 
establishing the meals as de minimis fringe benefits because the 
statute specifically mentions eating facilities, the meals occur too 
frequently, and accounting for them would not be difficult.37 The 
                                                                                                     
income); Google Mountain View (Global HQ), GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
about/jobs/locations/mountain-view/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (citing both 
Cafe Gia and Cafe 150 as “perks” in response to a frequently asked question 
entitled “What’s the best thing about working at Google Mountain View?” on a 
Google careers page) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 32. See Maremont, supra note 10 (“But these lawyers argue that some 
technology firms could qualify, in part because free food encourages longer work 
hours and is a crucial part of Silicon Valley’s collaborative culture.”); James B. 
Stewart, Looking for a Lesson in Google’s Perks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/business/at-google-a-place-to-work-and-
play.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (recounting a story 
from a Google employee who took a day off yet still came into the office, saying, 
“I live in a studio apartment, and I don’t have free food”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 33. See infra Part V (concluding the current Tax Code requires the 
employees to pay taxes on the free meals).  
 34. See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (analyzing the Tax Code 
language and subsequent regulations).  
 35. See infra Part III.A (discussing the applicable standards for de minimis 
fringe benefits); Part IV.A–B (discussing the applicable standards for the 
convenience-of-the-employer doctrine). 
 36. See infra Part V (recounting the argument that the meals are taxable 
because neither exclusion applies).  
 37. See infra Part III.B (analyzing these three reasons).  
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Note then argues that the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine 
does not apply.38 The meals do not serve a “substantial 
noncompensatory business reason,” which is required to establish 
the exclusion.39 Finally, this evidence will lead to the conclusion 
that the current Tax Code does mandate employees pay taxes on 
the meals, and that policy reasons should not prevent IRS 
enforcement.40 
II. Prevailing Legal Framework for Fringe Benefits 
To avoid tax liability, the Silicon Valley employees must 
prove that an exclusion allows them to leave the free meals out of 
their gross income. This Part provides a framework for the 
Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of fringe benefits. It 
establishes that the Silicon Valley companies provide meals that 
constitute gross income unless an applicable exclusion applies.41 
The following Parts address two possible exclusions for the free 
meals—the de minimis fringe benefit exclusion of § 13242 and the 
meals furnished for the convenience-of-the-employer exclusion of 
§ 119.43  
 
A. The Expansive Definition of Gross Income 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution allows the 
federal government to collect income taxes “from whatever source 
derived.”44 The Amendment engendered the modern federal tax 
system by allowing income taxation without apportionment, a 
                                                                                                     
 38. See infra Part IV.D (applying the doctrine to the free meal programs).  
 39. Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2)(i) (2013); see also infra Part IV.D (asserting 
that the employers do not need to provide free meals as a necessary component 
of business operations). 
 40. See infra Part V (concluding with this sentiment and evaluating some 
of the policy arguments).  
 41. See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (concluding that the Tax 
Code’s expansive base supports this claim).  
 42. I.R.C. § 132(e) (2012). 
 43. See id. § 119(a) (providing the statutory framework for the convenience-
of-the-employer doctrine).  
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  
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move away from a system based on consumption taxes.45 This 
broad power imposes no significant taxation limitations on 
Congress but rather grants it the ability to define and narrow 
taxable income.46 Subsequently, Congress has echoed the 
Sixteenth Amendment by also defining gross income utilizing the 
“whatever source derived” language.47 Section 61(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code48 defines gross income and casts a wide 
net, listing certain types of income but not limiting the definition 
in any way.49 Instead, Congress has used other statutes to 
provide specific and deliberate exclusions from this expansive 
definition.50 The landmark Supreme Court case Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co.51 reflects this notion.52 The Court strongly 
characterized gross income as Congress exerting its full taxing 
power, recognizing the “intention of Congress to tax all gains 
except those specifically exempted.”53 Accordingly, the Court 
ruled that the taxpayers’ awards of punitive damages were gross 
income because Congress did not enumerate such an exclusion.54 
For the purposes of evaluating the Silicon Valley meal programs, 
this background indicates that the tax base is expansive—any 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and 
the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091 (2001) (contending that 
the inadequacies of consumption taxes provided the impetus for a federal 
income tax).  
 46. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic Income Revisited: Response to 
Professors Johnson and Dodge, 45 TAX. L. REV. 707, 711 n.17 (1990) (stating the 
Sixteenth Amendment does not constrain how Congress and the courts may 
define taxation).  
 47. I.R.C. § 61(a).  
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. § 61(a)(1)–(15) (providing fifteen categories of potential income).  
 50. See, e.g., id. § 101 (providing an exclusion for certain death benefits); id. 
§ 104 (compensation for injuries and sickness); id. § 130 (scholarships); id. § 132 
(certain fringe benefits); id. § 134 (military benefits); id. § 136 (energy 
conservation subsidies); id. § 139 (disaster relief payments).  
 51. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).  
 52. See id. at 428–29 (deciding whether punitive damages fell within the 
scope of the 1939 definition of gross income, which is virtually identical to 
§ 61(a) for all intents and purposes).  
 53. Id. at 430.  
 54. See id. at 431–32 (finding no evidence that Congress intended to 
exempt these damages awards).  
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income not specifically exempted by statute, or limited by judicial 
or administrative interpretations, constitutes taxable income.55  
B. Free Meals as Fringe Benefits 
As a threshold issue, the free meals plainly constitute gross 
income under § 61(a)(1) as a fringe benefit.56 A fringe benefit is 
essentially any nonmonetary benefit an employee receives in 
connection to the provision of services.57 The examples are 
limitless, from a free parking spot to a company car.58 Section 132 
of the Internal Revenue Code lists fringe benefits excludable from 
taxable income.59 Congress first created this section in 1984, 
responding to concerns that the IRS would take new measures to 
create nonstatutory fringe benefit exclusions.60 Congress worried 
that the Treasury Department’s planned regulations would affect 
                                                                                                     
 55. See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME (10th ed. 2012) (describing these types of exemptions as the only limits 
to the scope of gross income).  
 56. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2012) (“[G]ross income means all income from 
whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: 
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and 
similar items . . . .”).  
 57. See, e.g., Universal Mar. Serv. Corp. v. Wright, 155 F.3d 311, 320 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he term ‘fringe benefits’ means those advantages given to an 
employee in addition to his regular, monetary pay whose value to the employee 
is too speculative to be readily converted into a cash equivalent.”); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1952 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a fringe benefit as “[a] benefit (other 
than direct salary or compensation) received by an employee from an employer, 
such as insurance, a company car, or a tuition allowance”); INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., PUBLICATION 15-B: EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO TAX FRINGE BENEFITS 2 (2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf (“A fringe benefit is a form of pay for the 
performance of services.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 161-21(a)(2) (2013) (listing examples of 
excludable fringe benefits). 
 59. See I.R.C. § 132 (listing eight current fringe benefit exclusions 
specifically envisioned by Congress).  
 60. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 
(creating § 132, which contained fringe benefit exclusions for no-additional-cost 
services, qualified employee discounts, working-condition fringe, and de minimis 
fringe); Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996 (barring the 
Treasury Department from promulgating new fringe benefit regulations to give 
Congress time to legislate).  
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some employee benefits that many did not consider taxable 
compensation yet leave some valuable benefits untaxed.61 In 
introducing the fringe benefits provisions of the Deficit Reduction 
Act, Congress sought to balance two considerations. First, it 
wanted to protect situations when employers provided their 
employees the same goods they sold to the public because those 
goods often served more than a compensatory purpose.62 Second, 
it wanted to prevent employers from taking advantage of tax-free 
benefits by clarifying fringe-benefit taxation.63 Without clear 
rules, tax incentives would exist to utilize more noncash 
compensation. This practice, in turn, would shrink the tax base 
and place a disproportionate tax burden on employees receiving 
cash income.64 Congress believed this bill ended the uncertainties 
about fringe-benefit taxation, making any fringe benefit that did 
not fit within a statutory provision taxable.65 This legislative 
history further illustrates that employees should pay tax on 
fringe benefits unless a statutory provision directly applies to the 
received benefit. 
The fringe benefits enjoyed by the Silicon Valley employees 
must be analyzed under this statutory framework. Regardless of 
how the employer characterizes the free meals, it cannot argue 
that daily free meals do not constitute fringe benefits under this 
broad definition simply because they are not cash compensation.66 
A free meal is a benefit no matter the motivation for providing it, 
and most of the Silicon Valley companies characterize it as 
such.67 If cups of coffee and personal use of the copier are fringe 
                                                                                                     
 61. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-697, at 7–8 (1977) (describing the reasons for the 
imposed moratorium on fringe benefit regulations).  
 62. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 286 (1983) (using the example of clothing 
store employees wearing the company brand).  
 63. See id. at 286–87 (expressing the desire to set clear boundaries for tax-
free benefits).  
 64. See id. at 287 (reiterating the goal of eliminating discrimination and 
inequities in benefits taxation).  
 65. See id. at 287–88 (stating that any fringe benefit not a part of the bill or 
the Code is taxable under §§ 61 and 83).  
 66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (2013) (“Gross income includes income realized 
in any form, whether in money, property, or services.”). 
 67. See supra notes 21–29 and accompanying text (describing how 
employees use free meals as an enviable perk in recruiting employees). 
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benefits, two or three lavish meals per day certainly fit within the 
category.68  
As a fringe benefit, the taxpayer must include the value of 
the free meals in gross income unless a related exclusion 
applies.69 In other words, § 61(a) presumptively includes the free 
meals as gross income, subjecting the employees to tax liability, 
unless the taxpayer can establish that a fringe benefit exclusion 
directly applies.70 Of all the possible exclusions, the Silicon Valley 
companies could only point to two as possibly relevant—the de 
minimis fringe benefit exclusion71 and the meals furnished for the 
convenience-of-the-employer exclusion.72 Each of these merits 
discussion, but the following analysis will demonstrate that 
neither applies to the free meals.73  
III. De Minimis Fringe Benefits 
A. Statutory Construction of § 132(e) 
Of the exclusions listed in § 132, the de minimis fringe 
provision is the only relevant exclusion for free meals.74 Neither 
the fringe benefits of “no-additional-cost service” nor “qualified 
employee discount” applies because each of those provisions 
focuses on benefits that do not cost an employer a substantial 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e) (providing examples of de minimis fringe 
benefits).  
 69. See id. § 1.61-21(a) (stating that gross income includes fringe benefits 
not covered by enumerated exclusions).  
 70. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (including all income as taxable unless an 
exclusion applies instead of limiting the types of taxable income to certain 
specified categories).  
 71. Id. § 132(e). 
 72. See id. § 119(a) (codifying this exclusion).  
 73. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the de minimis fringe exclusion); infra 
Part IV.D (evaluating the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine).  
 74. See I.R.C. § 132(a) (enumerating eight potential exclusions: “(1) no-
additional-cost service, (2) qualified employee discount, (3) working condition 
fringe, (4) de minimis fringe, (5) qualified transportation fringe, (6) qualified 
moving expense reimbursement, (7) qualified retirement planning services, or 
(8) qualified military base realignment and closure fringe”).  
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amount of money.75 The “working condition fringe” provision 
applies to either business expenses described in § 162 or 
depreciation in § 167, both of which are outside the scope of free 
meals provided at an employee’s workplace.76 Finally, the other 
fringe benefits listed in § 132 are much more specific and do not 
relate to employer-provided meals.77 Thus, the exclusion provided 
for de minimis fringe benefits under § 132 stands as the only 
option even relevant for removing these meals from the tax 
base.78 
De minimis fringe benefits are defined as “any property or 
service the value of which is (after taking into account the 
frequency with which similar fringes are provided by the 
employer to the employer’s employees) so small as to make 
accounting for it unreasonable or administratively 
impracticable.”79 The Treasury Department provides a few 
examples of excludable benefits: personal use of the copying 
machine; occasional parties or group meals; holiday gifts of 
property; coffee, donuts, and soft drinks; and other similar 
incidentals.80 It also provides instances of nonexcludable fringe 
                                                                                                     
 75. See id. § 132(b) (mandating that the employer not incur “substantial 
additional cost including forgoing revenue” in providing a service to an 
employee); id. § 132(c) (requiring any employee discount still have a price either 
at employer cost or at no more than twenty percent less than the normal price).  
 76. See id. § 132(d) (defining working condition fringe benefits); id. § 162 
(allowing a deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business”); id. § 167 
(providing a deduction for depreciation of business property).  
 77. See id. § 132(f) (allowing an exclusion for various transportation 
expenses involved in commuting to and from work); id. § 132(g) (providing an 
exclusion for employer reimbursement of moving expenses related to work); id. 
§ 132(m) (excluding retirement planning advice or information provided by an 
employer); id. § 132(n) (relating to military base realignment and closure).  
 78. But see id. § 132(e)(2)(B) (stating that meals fulfilling § 119 will be 
considered de minimis fringe under this provision). The statute states “[f]or 
purposes of subparagraph (B), an employee entitled under section 119 to exclude 
the value of a meal provided at such facility shall be treated as having paid an 
amount for such meal equal to the direct operating costs of the facility 
attributable to such meal.” Id. For the purposes of this Note, § 132 and § 119 are 
discussed separately, analyzing whether a taxpayer could exclude the meals 
under § 132(e) if § 119 did not apply. 
 79. Id. § 132(e)(1). 
 80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(e)(1) (2013) (listing these examples and 
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benefits, such as season tickets, country club or gym 
memberships, and use of corporate recreation facilities like 
hunting lodges or boats.81 Whether a benefit is de minimis often 
turns on the frequency with which the employee receives the 
benefit.82 A taxpayer must measure the frequency of the benefit 
in one of two ways. Primarily, frequency depends on how often an 
individual employee receives a particular benefit, rather than 
how often the total workforce receives a particular benefit.83 If it 
is difficult to determine how much an individual employee 
receives a benefit, then the taxpayer can determine frequency 
based on how much the employer provides the benefit to the 
entire workforce.84 These regulations indicate that receiving a 
daily benefit likely does not constitute de minimis fringe.85  
Additionally, the Internal Revenue Code includes a provision 
about eating facilities in relation to de minimis fringe benefits.86 
That provision allows the taxpayer to exclude certain free meals 
as de minimis if certain conditions apply: the employer must 
receive the meals at a facility on or near the business premises of 
the employer and the revenue the employer receives from those 
facilities must exceed the costs of operating them.87 This 
                                                                                                     
others that are excludable under I.R.C. § 132). 
 81. See id. § 1.132–6(e)(2) (listing these examples and others that are not 
excludable under I.R.C. § 132).  
 82. See I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (2012) (noting that the taxpayers must account for 
the frequency they receive the benefit in question when determining that 
benefit’s value).  
 83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(b)(1) (noting that this “employee-measured” 
way of determining frequency does not allow an employee to exclude a benefit 
provided infrequently to the entire workforce if he receives that benefit every 
day).  
 84. See id. § 1.132–6(b)(2) (stating the individual frequency is not 
important in circumstances when it is difficult to measure).  
 85. See id. § 1.132–6(b)(1) (“For example, if an employer provides a free 
meal in kind to one employee on a daily basis, but not to any other employee, 
the value of the meals is not de minimis with respect to that one employee.”). 
 86. See I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (defining an instance when meals from certain 
eating facilities automatically constitute a de minimis fringe benefit).  
 87. See id. § 132(e)(2)(A)–(B) (“The operation by an employer of any eating 
facility for employees shall be treated as a de minimis fringe if—(A) such facility 
is located on or near the business premises of the employer, and (B) revenue [is] 
derived from such . . . .”).  
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statutory framework provides the standard for determining 
whether the meals from the Silicon Valley employers are de 
minimis fringe benefits.88 
B. The Meals Do Not Constitute De Minimis Fringe Benefits 
Under § 132(e) 
Based on this legislative framework, the argument that the 
free meals are de minimis fringe benefits should fail to persuade 
the IRS.89 This argument would contend that accounting for the 
free meals would become “unreasonable or administratively 
impracticable” for these companies, analogizing the meals to free 
coffee or occasional pizza parties in an office.90 This argument is 
not persuasive for several reasons. First, the statute itself 
actually mentions eating facilities, allowing a de minimis 
exclusion if that facility’s revenue “equals or exceeds” its 
operating costs.91 Although the statute says “if” instead of “only 
if,” this language still implies that the companies cannot exclude 
the free meals if they receive no revenue from the cafes and spend 
millions of dollars each year to run them.92 The tax exclusion for 
these subsidized eating facilities derives from accounting 
difficulties.93 Congress did not wish to impose the burden of 
recording which employees ate at the facility on particular days 
or the costs of the particular meals, as long as the facility 
generally profited.94 The Silicon Valley companies could argue 
                                                                                                     
 88. See infra Part III.B (applying § 132(e) and asserting that these meals 
do not fall within the statutory scope).  
 89. See § 132(e)(1) (“The term ‘de minimis fringe’ means any property or 
service the value of which is (after taking into account the frequency with which 
similar fringes are provided by the employer to the employer’s employees) so 
small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively 
impracticable.”).  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. § 132(e)(2)(B).  
 92. Id.; see also supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text (describing the 
various estimates of Google’s food costs).  
 93. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 299 (1983) (discussing the decision to 
include subsidized eating facilities as a de minimis fringe benefit).  
 94. See id. (evaluating these recordkeeping difficulties but noting that an 
employee eating regularly at the facility may not necessarily fit within the 
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that they face a similar problem—they would find it difficult to 
individually account for the vast quantities of meals, drinks, and 
snacks consumed on a daily basis.95 Yet by adopting this 
provision, Congress chose to specifically limit the de minimis 
fringe benefits to profit-bearing meal facilities rather than free 
meal facilities.96 Thus, this eating facility provision in § 132 
strongly weighs against the Silicon Valley free meal programs as 
constituting de minimis fringe benefits especially when 
considering the legislative history.97 
Second, even without considering the meal-program 
provision, § 132 and its corresponding regulations emphasize that 
the frequency with which an employee receives the fringe benefit 
dictates whether it remains excludable.98 The de minimis fringe 
provisions allow the taxpayer to exclude meals occasionally, not 
on a regular or routine basis.99 The regulation explicitly states 
that an employee who receives a free meal on a daily basis cannot 
exclude those meals.100 Silicon Valley employees not only receive 
a meal each day, but often two or even three.101 Based on this 
                                                                                                     
exclusion).  
 95. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text (noting the vast quantity 
of options for food at Google and other companies).  
 96. See I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)(B) (2012) (requiring the eating facilities’ revenues 
exceed operating costs). Even without this provision, modern food service 
technology such as meal cards would seemingly make accounting relatively 
easy.  
 97. See id. (codifying this eating facility provision).  
 98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(b)(1)–(2) (2013) (describing how employers 
and employees should measure frequency in deciding whether a benefit is de 
minimis).  
 99. See id. § 1.132–6(d)(2) (allowing employer-provided meals on an 
occasional basis or for overtime work). 
 100. See id. (“For example, if an employer provides a free meal in kind to one 
employee on a daily basis, but not to any other employee, the value of the meals 
is not de minimis . . . .”). The regulation does state that the frequency of the 
benefit “is not relevant in some circumstances” when the employer controls the 
personal use of the benefit. Id. Personal use of a copier when an employee uses 
that copier for business purposes eighty-five percent of the time serves as an 
example. Id.  
 101. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 32 (describing an employee who even 
came into the office to eat on her off day).  
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frequency provision, de minimis fringe benefits do not apply to 
the free meals.102  
Third, accounting for the meals does not appear difficult 
enough for the IRS to deem “administratively impracticable.”103 
In cases which the IRS has discovered that employees excluded 
free meals improperly, the employer usually settles with the IRS 
and then decides on a fair market per-meal value to withhold 
from employee paychecks.104 This withholding practice 
demonstrates that these large companies could easily calculate a 
flat tax rate for each meal, and that number would not likely 
seem “so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable” in the 
eyes of the IRS.105 
These three reasons refute the possibility of a company such 
as Google or Facebook using § 132 to avoid tax liability when 
providing free meals.106 The de minimis piece of the Tax Code 
focuses on small perks in the workplace like communal soft 
drinks or the annual Christmas party, not two or three 
extravagant meals each day.107 Companies and firms that do not 
provide daily meals yet still serve food to their employees 
somewhat often may fit under this exclusion, however.108 For 
example, one San Francisco automotive parts manufacturer 
provides a catered meal every Friday.109 The Silicon Valley 
companies could assert that even if a weekly meal seems 
relatively frequent, the IRS’s more liberal stance on § 132 likely 
                                                                                                     
 102. See § 1.132–6(b)(1)–(2) (2013) (describing how employers and employees 
should measure frequency in deciding whether a benefit is de minimis). 
 103. I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (2012).  
 104. See Maremont, supra note 10 (stating that if the companies do settle 
with the IRS, many will increase compensation to cover the employees’ larger 
tax burden).  
 105. § 132(e)(1).  
 106. See supra notes 92–105 and accompanying text (analyzing these three 
reasons).  
 107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132–6(e)(1) (2013) (listing examples of acceptable de 
minimis fringe benefits, including occasional cocktail parties, picnics, flowers, 
low value birthday or holiday gifts, and occasional sporting event tickets).  
 108. See Ovide, supra note 24 (discussing how a large number of San 
Francisco businesses provide free food or similar benefits on a weekly or 
monthly basis).  
 109. See id. (examining San Francisco’s Mission Motor Company).  
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results in a business-friendly interpretation and a lack of 
enforcement.110 To reiterate, however, no interpretation of § 132 
would allow multiple daily meals and snacks, as their frequency 
and extravagance exceeds the scope of de minimis fringe 
benefits.111 Even assuming a weekly meal constitutes de minimis 
fringe benefits, the statutory language explicitly prohibits daily 
meals.112 Thus, § 132 does not serve as a shield for Google, 
Facebook, and the other meal-providing companies.113  
IV. Convenience-of-the-Employer Doctrine 
If § 132 provides no exclusion, the Silicon Valley companies 
have to rely on the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine. That 
doctrine provides an exclusion if the company-provided meals 
primarily serve the employer’s business rather than the 
employee.114 This Part discusses the history of the doctrine, its 
current form in § 119, and relevant cases before arguing that the 
Silicon Valley companies cannot use it as a valid exclusion for the 
free meal programs.  
A. The Development of the Convenience-of-the-Employer Doctrine 
The convenience-of-the-employer doctrine existed well before 
its 1954 codification in § 119 of the Internal Revenue Code.115 
                                                                                                     
 110. See IRS Letter Emphasizes the Liberal Tax Treatment of De Minimis 
Fringe Benefits, 34 PENS. & BEN. WK. NEWSL. no. 34 (Research Inst. of America), 
Aug. 25, 2008 (evaluating an IRS letter that emphasized the Code does not 
specify a dollar limit on de minimis fringe benefits).  
 111. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (describing the free meal 
plans at some Silicon Valley companies).  
 112. See Treas Reg. § 1.132–6(d)(2) (“For example, if an employer provides a 
free meal in kind to one employee on a daily basis . . . the value of the meals is 
not de minimis . . . .”). 
 113. See Maremont, supra note 10 (listing some of these companies).  
 114. See, e.g., Heyward v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 739, 743 (1961) (finding that the 
Senate reports indicate this is an appropriate phrasing of the rule), aff’d, 301 
F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1962).  
 115. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 855, 856 (1928) (applying the 
doctrine to taxes collected in 1921); see also 1919-1 C.B. 71 (US), 1919 WL 49990 
(representing the first mention of “convenience of the employer” in a treasury 
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Before that codification, courts applied two different standards—
the “employer-characterization” and “business-necessity” tests.116 
The employer-characterization test essentially turned on whether 
an employer intended free meals or lodging to form part of an 
employee’s compensation.117 Courts and the Treasury 
Department often looked to the accounting practices of the 
employer to make this distinction.118 This relatively low bar 
allowed the employer to decide whether free meals and housing 
constituted taxable income.119 Conversely, the business-necessity 
test represented a larger obstacle for employees seeking to 
exclude meals and lodging from their income.120 This test asked 
whether the benefit conferred serves as a necessary component to 
“the functioning of the employer’s business.”121 Reasoning that 
any free benefits would convenience the employee, judges applied 
this test to require the employer’s needs to form the primary 
reason for providing free meals and lodging.122 These contrasting 
tests created different outcomes for virtually identical cases.123 As 
                                                                                                     
decision).  
 116. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85–86 (1977) (comparing the two 
different doctrines).  
 117. See id. (describing various decisions that reflect this test).  
 118. Compare Doran v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 374, 376 (1953) (determining that 
the statute characterized state employee’s salary as base pay plus rental 
allowance, so that rental allowance was taxable income), with 1920-2 C.B. 90 
(US), 1920 WL 49099 (deciding “supper money” fell within the convenience-of-
the-employer exception because it was not “additional compensation and not 
being charged to the salary account”).  
 119.  See Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed 
Business Owners and Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 373 (2013) 
(stating that “the doctrine foreshadowed the extreme deference to business 
owners”).  
 120. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 88–89 (discussing Tax Court cases rejecting 
the idea that “would make tax consequences turn on the intent of the 
employer”).  
 121. Id. at 86.  
 122. See Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 839 (1937) (finding a hotel 
employee could exclude his housing “because he could not otherwise perform the 
services required of him” without living on the premises); Van Rosen v. Comm’r, 
17 T.C. 834, 838 (1951) (determining income was excludable when “the ends of 
the employer’s business dominated and controlled”).  
 123. Compare Doran, 21 T.C. at 376 (applying employer-characterization 
test to determine a university employee could not exclude his school-provided 
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a result, the Supreme Court admitted that the precodification 
doctrine was “not a tidy one.”124 When Congress decided to 
revamp the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, the new § 119 sought 
to “end the confusion as to the tax status of meals and lodging 
furnished an employee by his employer.”125  
The legislative history of that codification demonstrates how 
Congress implemented the convenience-of-the-employer 
doctrine.126 The House seemed to favor eliminating the 
convenience-of-the-employer test altogether.127 It proposed to 
allow exclusion of meals if the employer required the employee to 
eat on the premises.128 This broadly shaped exclusion completely 
avoided the compensation issue and instead would have allowed 
the employer to decide whether it would impose such a 
requirement.129 The Senate modified the House’s provisions, 
finding them too ambiguous.130 It decided to formally codify the 
convenience-of-the-employer doctrine, adding that the 
compensatory nature of benefits does not solely determine tax 
treatment.131 This decision constituted a “major revision” in the 
                                                                                                     
lodging), with Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1955) (applying the 
business-necessity doctrine to allow a psychiatrist at a mental institution to 
exclude his housing and meals from his income).  
 124. Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977).  
 125. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 18 (1954). 
 126. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 90–91 (“[T]he House and Senate initially 
differed on the significance that should be given the convenience-of-the-
employer doctrine for the purposes of § 119.”).  
 127. See id. at 91 (“[T]he House view apparently . . . required complete 
disregard of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.”). 
 128. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 18 (“[T]hese meals and lodging are to be 
excluded from employee’s income if they are furnished at the place of 
employment and the employee is required to accept them at the place of 
employment as a condition of his employment.”).  
 129. See id. (rejecting a previous test that determined “the value of meals 
and lodging are includible in the employee’s income, even where they are 
furnished for the convenience of the employer, if there is an indication that the 
meals and lodging were taken into account in establishing the salary paid”).  
 130. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 18 (1954) (finding the House provisions 
“ambiguous” because they failed to analyze the compensatory nature of 
benefits).  
 131. See id. (“[T]he basic test of exclusion is to be whether the meals or 
lodging are furnished primarily for the employer (and thus excludable) or 
whether they were primarily for the convenience of the employee (and therefore 
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prevailing tax treatment, resulting in the first iteration of 
§ 119.132 
B. The Modern Standard of the Doctrine Under § 119 
The 1954 statute established only two requirements for 
excluding meals—the employer must provide the meal for the 
“convenience of the employer” and the meal must be provided “on 
the business premises of the employer.”133 The Supreme Court 
first analyzed this framework in Commissioner v. Kowalski,134 a 
decision that serves as the most important judicial interpretation 
of § 119.135 The Court in Kowalski addressed the tax treatment of 
state-provided meal allowances for the New Jersey State 
Police.136 The State provided the officers bi-weekly cash payments 
for meals, and allowed those officers to eat wherever they wanted 
without providing any accounting.137 The Court sought to 
determine whether § 119 allowed officers to exclude that money 
from their incomes.138 Relying on precodification case law, New 
Jersey argued that the meal money did not constitute 
compensation because the allowance merely replaced a failed 
meal station program that allowed troopers to eat while still on 
                                                                                                     
taxable).”); JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, SUMMARY OF THE NEW 
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, at 13 (1955) (stating that 
the Senate intended to “specifically nullify the ‘indication of compensation’ 
rule”).  
 132. Albert A. Gordon, The “Convenience of the Employer” Exclusion and the 
Partner-Employee: A New Look, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 781 (1968). 
 133. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 106 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  
 134. 434 U.S. 77 (1977). 
 135. See, e.g., So There Was a Free Lunch After All: CA-9 Reverses Boyd 
Gaming, 90 J. TAX’N 324 at *1 (1999) (describing Kowalski as a “benchmark 
Supreme Court decision”).  
 136. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 79–82 (describing the meal allowances at 
issue). 
 137. See id. at 80–81 (noting that the troopers received the same allowance, 
paid bi-weekly, whether or not they were on patrol, and the State required no 
proof that the troopers used the money for their lunches). 
 138. See id. at 78 (stating the issue presented was whether the allowances 
were includable in gross income under § 61(a) and, if so, otherwise excludable 
under § 119).  
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duty.139 The Court held that the 1954 statute did not allow a 
taxpayer to exclude cash payments under the convenience-of-the-
employer doctrine.140 It reasoned that even if New Jersey 
provided the cash allowances for its convenience, they did not fit 
within § 119 because they were not actual meals.141 Furthermore, 
even if §119 allowed cash allowances for food, the Court found 
that the meal allowances did not seem necessary for an officer to 
“properly perform his duties.”142  
Kowalski is important because the Court reiterated that 
§ 119 replaced prior law and the precodification notion of the 
doctrine.143 Without that case law, § 119 could not allow the 
exclusion because the officers received cash for meals instead of 
the actual meals.144 Additionally, the Court determined that the 
new statute followed the business-necessity test.145 It adopted the 
“properly perform his duties” language,146 and in doing so 
explicitly rejected the employee characterization doctrine.147 
                                                                                                     
 139. See id. at 83 (relying on “lower-court cases and administrative rulings” 
that determined payments for the convenience of the employer were not 
compensatory).  
 140. See id. at 94–95 (rejecting New Jersey’s argument that § 119’s 
legislative history indicated that Congress desired to exclude cash 
reimbursements).  
 141. See id. at 84 (“By its terms, § 119 covers meals furnished by the 
employer and not cash reimbursements for meals.”).  
 142. Id. at 95.  
 143. See id. at 93 (noting that the codification “comprehensively modified the 
prior law, both expanding and contracting the exclusion”).  
 144. See id. at 84 (determining cash reimbursements did not constitute 
meals under § 119).  
 145. See id. (determining that Congress followed the rationale behind Van 
Rosen v. Comm’r in adopting § 119); Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 
1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Court examined the history of section 119 and 
concluded that the ‘convenience of the employer’ should be measured according 
to a ‘business-necessity’ theory.”); supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text 
(comparing precodification cases).  
 146. Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977). 
 147. See id. at 92 (“The language of § 119 quite plainly rejects the reasoning 
behind rulings . . . which rest on the employer’s characterization of the nature of 
a payment.”). Some scholars believe that in practice, the employer-
characterization view still prevails in contradiction to Kowalski. See Fellows & 
Kahng, supra note 119, at 375 (“It is clear that the ‘convenience-of-the-employer’ 
requirement has returned to the deferential standard Congress had turned 
away from when it enacted I.R.C. § 119.”). This Note discusses this contention 
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Kowalski conveyed that an employer must affirmatively 
demonstrate that it provides free meals for a business purpose 
rather than merely relying on whether the employer accounts for 
the meals as compensation.148  
Two amendments to § 119 after Kowalski warrant 
mentioning for the purpose of applying the statute to the Silicon 
Valley companies. First, in 1978, Congress determined that the 
ability of an employee to accept or decline meals does not 
implicate the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.149 Second, a 
1998 amendment clarified situations in which only some 
employees of a company claimed the convenience-of-the-employer 
exclusion.150 If at least half of the meals provided to employees 
are for the convenience of the employer, then for tax purposes, all 
of the meals on the premises are for the convenience of the 
employer.151 Thus, the modern version of the statute maintains 
the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine but provides little 
guidance for its application, requiring considerable emphasis on 
the particular circumstances of each case.152  
The Treasury Department has promulgated a series of 
regulations to interpret and enforce § 119.153 The regulations 
                                                                                                     
as it relates to the practices of the Silicon Valley companies. See infra notes 
246–48 and accompanying text (arguing that these companies would have to 
apply the employer-characterization test to establish an exclusion). 
 148. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 86 (rejecting “an exclusion from income based 
solely on an employer’s characterization of a payment as noncompensatory”).  
 149. See Act of October 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 119(b)(2) (2012)) (“In determining whether meals are furnished for the 
convenience of the employer, the fact that a charge is made for such meals, and 
the fact that the employee may accept or decline such meals, shall not be taken 
into account.”).  
 150. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (“All meals furnished on the business 
premises . . . shall be treated as furnished for the convenience of the employer 
if . . . more than half of the employees to whom such meals are furnished on 
such premises are furnished such meals for the convenience of the employer.”). 
 151. Id.  
 152. See Jane Zhao, Note, Nights on the Museum: Should Free Housing 
Provided to Museum Directors Also Be Tax-Free?, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 427, 436 
(2012) (“[T]he characterization of employer-provided meals or housing varies 
significantly with the facts of each case.”).  
 153. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (2013) (clarifying the language and meaning 
found in § 119).  
FIVE-STAR EXCLUSION 2099 
reiterate that the convenience-of-the-employer test requires 
“analysis of all the facts and circumstances in each case,” but the 
Department’s interpretation identifies a variety of common 
factors to consider.154 The regulations echo the business-necessity 
test by requiring a “substantial noncompensatory business reason 
of the employer” to exclude free meals from the taxpayer’s 
income.155 Nevertheless, the regulations maintain that meals may 
have a compensatory purpose as long as this “business reason” 
still exists.156  
Several qualifications that fulfill this requirement are 
relevant. First, employees that must remain on call for 
emergencies fulfill this requirement.157 Second, employees may 
exclude meals provided on account of an employer-required 
shorter meal period because employees would not have time to 
eat elsewhere.158 Third, circumstances could prevent the 
employee from securing a meal within a proper time, such as an 
employer located in a remote location.159 The regulations also 
note that providing meals “to promote the morale or goodwill of 
the employee, or to attract prospective employees” does not 
adequately fulfill this “substantial business reason” 
requirement.160 Finally, the Treasury Department provides 
several relevant examples of situations in which an employee can 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(1); see also id. § 1.119-1(a)(2) (listing various 
considerations for meals furnished without a charge).  
 155. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i).  
 156. See id. (“[I]f the employer furnishes meals to his employee for a 
substantial noncompensatory business reason, the meals so furnished will be 
regarded as furnished for the convenience of the employer, even though such 
meals are also furnished for a compensatory reason.”). 
 157. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(a) (“[I]t must be shown that emergencies have 
actually occurred, or can reasonably be expected to occur, in the employer’s 
business which have resulted, or will result, in the employer calling on the 
employee to perform his job during his meal period.”).  
 158. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(b) (“[M]eals are furnished to the employee 
during his working hours because the employer’s business is such that the 
employee must be restricted to a short meal period . . . .”).  
 159. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(c) (“[T]he meals are furnished to the employee 
during his working hours because the employee could not otherwise secure 
proper meals within a reasonable meal period.”). 
 160. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(iii).  
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appropriately exclude meals:161 bank tellers who must limit 
lunches to thirty minutes;162 an employee at a state institution 
required to remain on duty at all times;163 a construction 
employee at a remote job site;164 and a hospital that provides a 
free cafeteria to keep employees on call but that does not require 
employees to remain on premises.165 However, the regulations say 
that a remote company that allows an employee to either 
purchase a meal on-site or bring a meal to work does not fulfill 
the standard.166 None of the examples directly addresses the issue 
here.  
Aside from these regulations, the IRS has issued limited 
other guidance on the matter. Most of the Agency’s statements 
about § 119 concern more traditional and obvious applications of 
the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine—they have allowed 
exclusions for airline flight crew members,167 hospital 
employees,168 and church staff.169 No ruling or memorandum has 
applied directly to the free meals at issue here, except for an 
advice memorandum on certain investment bank employees.170 
That memorandum was particularly strict, requesting a clear 
showing of necessary shorter meal periods and emergency 
situations along with forbidding any free meals other than those 
in the lunch period.171 Although relevant, that memorandum 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(1)–(9).  
 162. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(3). 
 163. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(5).  
 164. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(7).  
 165. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(9). 
 166. Id. § 1.119-1(f)(8).  
 167. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory 201151020, 2011 WL 6464323 (Aug. 
31, 2011) (finding that the requirement that crew remain on airplanes during 
meal periods served as a noncompensatory business reason).  
 168. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-38-142 (June 27, 1980) (allowing exclusion 
for employees in remote hospital whose lunch periods were restricted to thirty 
minutes for emergency-availability reasons).  
 169. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-29-037 (Apr. 23, 1991) (allowing exclusion 
for church ministers and staff because they needed to be available around-the-
clock for prayer and support). 
 170. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory, 2002 WL 1315674 (advising on free 
meals supplied by a bank that conducted private banking and securities 
transactions.) 
 171. See id. (listing these requirements and requesting the bank provide 
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relied on a later-overturned case, so its persuasive value is 
admittedly limited.172 Accordingly, other case law must 
supplement this lack of IRS guidance. 
C. The Role of Business Judgment  
As discussed, the passage of § 119 explicitly rejected the 
employer-characterization test in favor of the business-necessity 
doctrine.173 The employer-characterization model focused on 
whether the employer intended the meals as primarily 
compensation or for a necessary business purpose.174 Even if this 
approach is no longer law, the convenience-of-the-employer 
doctrine still incorporates a business judgment aspect. The 
following cases from the Ninth Circuit indicate how courts 
consider a company’s reasoning for providing free meals or 
lodging to its employees when applying § 119.175 
First, Caratan v. Commissioner176 involved § 119’s 
application to farm employees.177 Caratan required its 
supervisory and management personnel to reside on the farm for 
around-the-clock management decisions, so it provided lodging 
free of charge.178 The lower court held that the taxpayers had not 
proved that the provided lodging “was indispensable to the proper 
                                                                                                     
more evidence about its meal practices).  
 172. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-445 (Sept. 30, 
1997), rev’d, 177 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999) (deciding casino employees were not 
entitled to exclude meals under § 119).  
 173. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85–86 (1977) (comparing the two 
doctrines); supra notes 122–48 and accompanying text (discussing the history of 
§ 119 and the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine).  
 174. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 85–86 (describing the employer-
characterization test’s intent component). 
 175. See infra Part IV.C (discussing cases that assert that courts respect a 
company’s judgment that free meals are necessary if provided with legitimate 
reasoning).  
 176. 442 F.2d 606 (1971).  
 177. See id. at 607 (describing M. Caratan, Inc. as a farming operation that 
primarily sold grapes).  
 178. See id. at 607–08 (providing testimony that some farming practices, 
such as irrigation, occurred twenty-four hours per day, which necessitated a 
supervisor’s presence both day and night).  
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discharge of their employment duties.”179 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this evaluation, holding that the taxpayers could exclude 
the lodging because it was a condition of their employment under 
§ 119.180 The court reasoned that no evidence had contradicted 
the taxpayers’ contention that they could not simply live near the 
farm, so the lower court erred in deciding that the farm could 
possibly operate differently.181 Caratan counsels that no court can 
form a business judgment about the necessity of providing free 
food or lodging when all evidence supports the opposite 
conclusion.182 Thus, this case indicates that § 119 allows the 
taxpayer to exclude free meals or lodging if the employer provides 
suitable evidence that the benefit is necessary to its business 
operations.183  
Additionally, Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner184 follows 
Caratan and provides relevant legal analysis.185 In Boyd Gaming, 
a hotel required its employees to remain at the hotel and receive 
free meals in the cafeteria, pointing to certain unique aspects of 
the casino industry.186 The dispute concerned application of the 
“substantial noncompensatory business reason” test provided in 
                                                                                                     
 179. Caratan v. Comm’r, 52 T.C. 960, 963 (1969).  
 180. See Caratan, 442 F.2d at 611 (reasoning that the taxpayers met their 
burden of proof).  
 181. See id. at 609–10 (discussing that the lower court did not weigh 
evidence but rather substituted its own judgment about farming operations).  
 182. See id. at 610 (determining the lower court’s conclusions constituted a 
business judgment separate from all the evidence provided by the taxpayers’ 
witnesses). 
 183. See id. (rejecting the possible availability of feasible alternative housing 
as contradicting the farm’s business judgment).  
 184. 177 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 185. See id. at 1097 (“This case involves the question whether there really is 
a ‘free lunch.’”). This case concerns § 119 in a roundabout way. If meals from an 
on-premises facility are for the convenience of the employer, they constitute a de 
minimis fringe benefit under I.R.C. § 132(e) (2012). If a de minimis benefit, they 
are exempt from the deduction limits that I.R.C. § 274(n) provides for business 
meals. This case began when Congress lowered the deduction limit from one 
hundred percent to eighty percent. Id. Nevertheless, the case focuses on the 
convenience-of-the-employer doctrine as the key issue. See id. (noting the case 
originated from the Tax Court’s rejection of Boyd’s § 119 claim).  
 186. See id. at 1097–98 (listing concerns relating to security, efficiency, 
emergencies, and lack of close alternatives).  
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Treasury Regulation § 1.119–1(a)(2)(i).187 To meet this test, the 
hotel argued that it required the employees to remain on business 
premises for reasons the regulations contemplated, such as 
availability for emergencies, short meal periods, and food service 
responsibilities.188 The lower court asserted that the regulations 
for § 119 required a “business nexus,” meaning that the employee 
must accept the meal as part of his employment duties or job 
description.189 The Ninth Circuit rejected this notion, however.190 
It decided that the hotel’s stay-on-premises requirement fulfilled 
§ 119 and Kowalski, which required no additional business 
nexus.191 As discussed, Kowalski required convenience-of-the-
employer meals to relate to an employee properly performing his 
duties.192 Boyd Gaming says that these duties refer to an 
employee doing the tasks his or her job requires, rather than 
referring to a job that innately requires consuming food during 
it.193 The court reasoned that the meals must not relate to the 
employees’ specific duties in a strict sense, as the lower court 
held, or else the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine would only 
apply to “restaurant critics and dieticians.”194 Instead, Boyd fit 
within § 119 because it provided legitimate business reasons for 
requiring its employees to remain on the premises to perform 
                                                                                                     
 187. Id. at 1099; see also supra notes 153–66 and accompanying text 
(discussing the applicable treasury regulations corresponding to I.R.C. § 119).  
 188. See Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d at 1100 (describing the arguments the Tax 
Court rejected before the appeal).  
 189. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1997-445, 1997 WL 
599594, at *18 (Sep. 30, 1997) (finding that the meals were not necessary to 
allow the employees to perform their jobs properly).  
 190. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(asserting that the Tax Court misinterpreted § 119 and Kowalski with its 
“substantial business reason” analysis). 
 191. See id. at 1101 (“Contrary to the Tax Court’s conclusion, no nexus other 
than the ‘stay-on-premises’ policy was required for the meals to satisfy the 
Kowalski test.”).  
 192. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977) (adopting the business-
necessity test); supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text (analyzing 
Kowalski).  
 193. See Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d at 1101 (finding that the test would rarely 
be satisfied if it required an employee’s specific duties relate to consuming food).  
 194. Id.  
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their jobs.195 The court explained, “[c]aptive employees had no 
choice but to eat on the premises.”196  
Thus, Boyd Gaming stands for three relevant propositions. 
First, providing free meals because employees must remain on 
business premises for legitimate reasons adequately meets the 
convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.197 Second, § 119 does not 
require free meals to directly relate to the performance of an 
employee’s “specific” duties to constitute legitimate business 
reasons.198 Third, courts will respect a company’s business 
judgment about these legitimate reasons if they do not merely 
constitute a sham.199 This component of the case directly relates 
to the Silicon Valley companies, especially because the IRS 
acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit’s decision.200 Quoting Boyd 
Gaming, the IRS indicated it would take a middle course 
regarding the appropriateness of an employer-furnished meal 
policy: it will “not attempt to substitute its judgment for the 
business decisions of an employer,” yet it would not allow an 
employer “to wave a ‘magic wand’” and simply declare its policies 
qualified under § 119.201 This guidance counsels businesses to 
create a meals policy deriving from actual business needs and 
follow that policy to allow tax exclusion.202  
                                                                                                     
 195. See id. at 1097–98 (accepting the hotel’s judgment that it needed 
employees on-site for security and emergency demands). 
 196. Id. at 1101. 
 197. See id. (determining that the casino had explained a reasonable need to 
keep employees from traveling off-premises for meals).  
 198. See id. (noting that a business nexus is not required).  
 199. See id. (demonstrating that a court should give some credence to the 
business decisions of employers). 
 200. See Announcement 99-77, 1999–32 I.R.B. 243 at *1 (making the 
recommendation of acquiescence to the Boyd Gaming decision). 
 201. See id. (quoting Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1101 
(9th Cir. 1999)).  
 202. See id. (“Thus, the Service will consider whether the policies decided 
upon by the employer are reasonably related to the needs of the employer’s 
business (apart from a desire to provide additional compensation to its 
employees) and whether these policies are in fact followed in the actual conduct 
of the business.”). Some scholars note that this IRS statement requires less of an 
explanation for prohibiting or restricting employees from leaving for lunch but a 
clear showing that this prohibition or restriction actually occurs. See MARTIN J. 
MCMAHON & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
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When considering whether an employer provides meals for a 
substantial business reason, Caratan and Boyd Gaming advise 
that the employer’s bona fide business judgment provides the 
basis for the decision rather than a court’s.203 In other words, 
§ 119 will protect the company that makes a rational decision 
about providing free meals or lodging for business needs.204 This 
business judgment component serves as an important piece of 
analysis when considering the Silicon Valley meal practices.205 
D. The Meals Fail the Convenience-of-the-Employer Test Under 
§ 119 
All available evidence suggests that the Silicon Valley meals 
are not for the convenience of the employer within the meaning of 
§ 119, so the employees do have tax liability. To reiterate the 
applicable standard, the employer must provide meals for a 
“substantial noncompensatory business reason” on the business 
premises.206 As the regulations and cases on § 119 demonstrate, 
this analysis depends on the factual circumstances of each benefit 
program.207 This subpart first argues that the companies fulfill 
none of the enumerated business reasons in the regulations, and 
                                                                                                     
¶ 8.08 (2d ed. 2013) (“It appears from this statement that the IRS will not 
question an employer’s judgment in prohibiting or restricting the employees’ 
ability to leave the business premises for meals, . . . but it will demand that the 
employer actually prohibit or restrict employees from leaving the business 
premises . . . .”). 
 203. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(finding it inappropriate to second-guess decisions about the casino business); 
Caratan v. Comm’r, 442 F.2d 606, 610 (1969) (counseling against using a court’s 
decisions about the farming business over the employer’s business experience).  
 204. See Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d at 1101 (requiring the employer to support 
its policies with legitimate business reasons).  
 205. See infra notes 232–36 and accompanying text (discerning whether 
legitimate reasons support the Silicon Valley companies’ business judgment).  
 206. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(1) (2013); supra Part IV.A (describing the 
statutory framework of the convenience-of-the-employer test).  
 207. See id. (“The question of whether meals are furnished for the 
convenience of the employer is one of fact to be determined by analysis of all the 
facts and circumstances in each case.”). 
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it asserts that the companies’ potential explanations also do not 
constitute substantial business reasons.208  
1. The Regulations Provide No Business Reasons for the Free 
Meals 
To exclude the meals, the taxpayer has the burden of finding 
clear statutory language to justify an exclusion.209 The free meal 
programs do not meet this standard. Although the statute does 
not explicitly define “convenience of the employer,”210 the 
corresponding regulations provide enough guidance to 
demonstrate that the Silicon Valley employees should pay taxes 
on the free meals.211 The companies must provide a reason for the 
free meals aside from boosting employee morale or recruiting the 
best employees.212 The Silicon Valley companies immediately face 
an uphill battle, however, because they cannot point to any of the 
frequent noncompensatory business reasons found in the 
regulations.213 Two of these enumerated reasons deserve analysis.  
                                                                                                     
 208. See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing that the regulations provide no 
enumerated business reason to which the Silicon Valley Companies can 
analogize their meal practices); infra Part IV.D.2 (finding the alternative 
business reasons do not satisfy § 119).  
 209. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2012) (listing fringe benefits as a part of 
gross income); Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) 
(describing Congress’s intention to tax all income unless a specific exemption 
applies); supra Part II.A–B (providing the background for gross income and 
fringe benefit taxation). 
 210. See I.R.C. § 119(a) (establishing an exclusion for meals provided for the 
convenience of the employer but not defining it).  
 211. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1 (providing extensive definitions and examples 
for what constitutes substantial business reasons for providing meals to 
employees).  
 212. See id. § 1.119–1(2)(iii) (“Meals will be regarded as furnished for a 
compensatory business reason of the employer when the meals are furnished to 
the employee to promote the morale or goodwill of the employee, or to attract 
prospective employees.”).  
 213. See id. § 1.119–1(2(ii) (listing six categories of frequently cited 
noncompensatory business reasons that can be summarized as follows: 
emergency duties; necessarily-shortened lunch periods; remote jobsites; 
restaurant employment; reason exists for most employees; missed meal during 
working hours); supra notes 154–66 and accompanying text (discussing the 
regulation’s substantial business reason requirement).  
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First, the taxpayer could argue that the “short meal period” 
reason in § 1.119–1(a)(iii)(b) applies because the meals save 
time compared to leaving the premises.214 That provision is not 
that broad: it requires that “the employee must be restricted to 
a short meal period” because of the nature of the employer’s 
business.215 The regulations use a position such as a bank teller 
as an example, where banks require thirty-minute lunches 
because peak business occurs during the traditional lunch 
break.216 The Silicon Valley companies are not analogous. 
Although the employees may enjoy saving time using the on-
premises facilities, the nature of the tech industry does not 
require shorter meal periods nor do the employers impose time 
limits.217 Google’s encouragement of on-the-job bowling and 
massages underscores this point.218 Additionally, many of the 
meals are consumed either before or after the workday,219 so 
they generally do not fall within the scope of this time-saving 
category nor the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.220 Thus, 
                                                                                                     
 214. See id. § 1.119–1(a)(iii)(b) (stating that the need for employees to have a 
shorter meal period is a substantial noncompensatory business reason).  
 215. Id. § 1.119–1(a)(iii)(b). 
 216. See id. § 1.119–1(f)(3) (allowing bank tellers with this restricted lunch 
period to exclude on-premises meals provided by the employer).  
 217. See, e.g., Karyn Johnson, Perks at Work: Unconventional Benefits Can 
Attract and Keep Employees, NWJOBS (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://blog.nwjobs.com/careercenter/perks_at_work_unconventional_benefits_ca
n_attract_and_keep_employees.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating that 
the employees of one tech company would do CrossFit exercises during their 
lunch breaks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 218. See Smith, supra note 2 (describing the different leisure activities 
available to Google’s employees during the workday).  
 219. See, e.g., id. (quoting a former Google employee who stated he would eat 
a free breakfast before starting work and remain late to eat a free dinner); 
Kane, supra note 23 (describing the happy hour and dinner service at Zynga, 
which presumably many employees would attend after completing their work 
for the day).  
 220. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2) (2013) (“Generally, meals furnished 
before or after the working hours of the employee will not be regarded as 
furnished for the convenience of the employer.”). But see id. § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(d) 
(providing an exception to this general rule for restaurant employees); id. 
§ 1.119–1(2)(ii)(f) (allowing the exclusion to apply when duties during normal 
working hours prevented the employee from obtaining a meal with a substantial 
noncompensatory business reason).  
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this time-restriction category does not apply to the Silicon 
Valley companies unless they provide a business need for 
shortened meal periods other than the desire to simply save 
time.221 
Second, the only other enumerated reason would contend 
that the employees cannot travel off-premises to obtain another 
meal in a reasonable time under § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(c).222 Usually, 
this provision applies in situations when work occurs in remote 
locations without available alternatives to purchase meals.223 
For tech companies located directly in San Francisco or New 
York, this regulation does not apply because those cities have 
almost limitless food options.224 Google and Facebook do have 
their headquarters a considerable distance outside of San 
Francisco in Mountain View and Menlo Park, respectively.225 
These towns, however, still have a variety of restaurants within 
close proximity to the business campuses, which employees 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(b) (stating this category does not apply when an 
employer limits a lunch break to allow the employee to finish work earlier in the 
day). 
 222. See id. § 1.119–1(2)(ii)(c) (“Meals will be regarded as furnished for a 
substantial noncompensatory business reason of the employer when the meals 
are furnished to the employee during his working hours because the employee 
could not otherwise secure proper meals within a reasonable meal period.”). 
 223. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 16, 21 (D. Wyo. 1966) 
(finding that feeding employees was indispensable for the ranch business 
because the nearest town was twenty-four miles away); Stone v. Comm’r, 32 
T.C. 1021, 1024–25 (1959) (applying doctrine to tunnel construction site forty 
miles away from nearest town).  
 224. See, e.g., Robin Wilkey, San Francisco Restaurants Outnumber Every 
City in America, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/02/san-francisco-restaurants_n_1735 
091.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating that San Francisco has the most 
restaurants per capita in the United States at 39.3 restaurants per ten 
thousand households, with New York City having the fourth most) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 225. See Google Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ 
facts/locations/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing the address to the 
company’s Mountain View, CA headquarters) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Facebook HQ, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages/ 
Facebook-HQ/166793820034304 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (providing the 
address to Facebook’s Menlo Park, CA headquarters) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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could easily travel to within a lunch hour.226 In fact, even local 
restaurants complain that the free meal programs have cost 
them considerable business from Google employees, which 
illustrates that those employees had several nearby options 
before the free meal program’s genesis.227 Thus, at least 
regarding their corporate headquarters, Google and Facebook 
cannot fulfill the convenience-of-the-employer test because of a 
lack of alternative restaurant options for their employees. 
2. The Companies Can Provide No Alternative Business Needs to 
Satisfy § 119 
If the Silicon Valley companies cannot point to one of the 
business reasons enumerated in the regulations, they would have 
to provide alternative reasons that conform to § 119. Their 
argument would rely on Boyd Gaming by asserting its reasons for 
the policies and asking the IRS to respect the business judgment 
behind those reasons.228 In Boyd Gaming, the taxpayer provided 
a list of business ideas behind its requirement to keep employees 
on the premises, all relating to the nature of the casino 
industry.229 To provide a similar list, the Silicon Valley companies 
would necessarily cite reasons related to productivity and the 
work environment. They could contend their practices increase 
output because the free meals keep employees at work for longer 
                                                                                                     
 226. See, e.g., Michelle Mills, 4 Local Restaurants Officially Certified for 
Delivering Authentic Neapolitan Pizza, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2014, 
12:53 PM), http://www.sgvtribune.com/lifestyle/20140306/4-local-restaurants-
officially-certified-for-delivering-authentic-neapolitan-pizza (last visited Sept. 
24, 2014) (listing local pizza restaurants) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 227. See Daniel Ebolt, Can’t Compete with Free Eats, MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE 
(July 11, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://www.mv-voice.com/news/2013/07/11/cant-
compete-with-free-eats (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing how Mountain 
View restaurant owners lost the majority of their business when Google began 
providing free meals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 228. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a court should not substitute its business judgment when 
evaluating the decisions of a company).  
 229. See id. at 1097–98 (listing concerns relating to security, efficiency, 
emergencies, and lack of close alternatives). 
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hours; the open cafeterias encourage collaboration and 
interaction; and the meals improve employee health and 
energy.230 This argument fails for two reasons.  
First, the employees do not require the meals to properly 
perform their jobs at the Silicon Valley companies.231 The modern 
version of the doctrine derives from the “business-necessity” test, 
which asks whether the employer needed to provide meals for its 
business to function.232 Virtually every case applying the 
doctrine—deciding whether an employer had a “substantial 
noncompensatory business reason” for furnishing free meals or 
lodging—has focused on whether the meals or lodging were a 
condition precedent to business operations.233 In other words, 
courts have interpreted the noncompensatory business reason as 
those that correlate to accomplishing an essential component—
“business needs” rather than “business wants.”234 For the Silicon 
Valley companies, providing free meals to employees does not 
satisfy this requirement because they do not need the meals to 
“properly perform their duties.”235 No part of developing software 
or producing code requires unlimited steak or sushi at lunch.236 
These companies can provide meals to make their employees 
                                                                                                     
 230. See Maremont, supra note 10 (describing a few of these arguments).  
 231. See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977) (requiring meals and 
lodging be provided to an employee “to properly perform his duties” to satisfy 
the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine). 
 232. See id. at 86–88 (describing the business-necessity test); supra notes 
134–48 and accompanying text (analyzing Kowalski and its interpretation of 
§ 119).  
 233. Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2); see, e.g., Boyd Gaming, 177 F.3d. at 1097–
98 (deciding that the employer needed its employees to stay on-premises during 
work hours because of the nature of the casino business); Caratan v. Comm’r, 
442 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1971) (determining that providing meals and lodging 
to employees was indispensable to the proper functioning of the farm); Jacob v. 
United States, 493 F.2d 1294, 1298 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding that a director’s 
around-the-clock availability for emergencies at an institute for the mentally 
handicapped was a substantial noncompensatory business reason). 
 234. See, e.g., supra notes 156–66 and accompanying text (listing regulations 
that provide acceptable noncompensatory business reasons that allow an 
employer to provide free meals).  
 235. Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95. 
 236. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
the lavish meals provided to employees). 
FIVE-STAR EXCLUSION 2111 
comfortable and happy with the hope they produce better results, 
but in no way is it essential to operations. Additionally, the 
companies do not require the employees to eat the meals or 
restrict them to the business premises, and these employees could 
perform their jobs by bringing their lunches or leaving for an 
outside lunch.237 The meals do not relate to employment duties 
but rather only enhance the employment itself.238 Accepting this 
“increased productivity and collaboration” argument would 
extend the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine to a scope wholly 
unsupported by fifty years of statutory interpretation and would 
reject the legislative intent behind § 119.239 The nature of the Tax 
Code does not allow such significant departures from its 
boundaries, but rather would require Treasury Department 
regulation or congressional action to broaden the exclusion.240 
Until such action occurs, the Silicon Valley companies cannot 
demonstrate their practices derive from substantial 
noncompensatory business reasons.  
Second, all outward evidence indicates that these Silicon 
Valley companies mainly provide these meals as compensation—
a way to compete for the best talent and keep morale high.241 
Congress defined § 119 to ask whether meals or lodging are 
furnished primarily for the convenience of the employer (and 
excludable) or the employee (and subsequently taxable).242 Even 
                                                                                                     
 237. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(f)(8) (stating that meals sold by a company 
cafeteria were not for the convenience of the employer even when no outside 
eating facilities were available because the employee could bring his own lunch).  
 238. See Comm’r v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595, 597–98 (8th Cir. 1956) (discussing 
the convenience-of-the-employer rule as implicating meals and lodging provided 
“as a necessary incident of the proper performance of [an employee’s] duty”); 
S.S. Kresge Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (“To 
come within the ‘convenience of the employer rule’, it is essential that the 
employee be required to accept the meals to properly perform his duties.”).  
 239. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text (providing IRS 
decisions applying § 119).  
 240. See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text (describing congressional 
apprehension at creating extra-statutory exclusions that depart from the 
Internal Revenue Code).  
 241. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119–1(a)(2)(iii) (2013) (stating that meals furnished 
to promote morale or attract prospective employees are considered a 
compensatory business reason).  
 242. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 18 (1954) (stating the appropriate test as 
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if increasing time spent at work did constitute a 
noncompensatory business reason, the free meal programs do not 
serve this purpose primarily. Instead, the free meals primarily 
benefit the employee, and the companies market them 
accordingly: Google lists the free meals as “perks” in response to a 
FAQ entitled “What’s the best thing about working at Google 
Mountain View?” on a Google careers page;243 Zynga provides free 
food as a “perk to keep employees happy and healthy;”244 Yahoo! 
began a free meal program at Marissa Mayer’s command to 
compete for talent.245 The characterization that these meal 
programs derive from noncompensatory business reasons 
constitutes “wav[ing] a magic wand” and forming a sham tax 
shelter.246 Accepting this justification would represent a return to 
the employer-characterization test that § 119 specifically 
eliminated.247 Instead, the objective circumstances demonstrate 
compensatory motives.248 For these reasons, the free meals are 
not for the convenience-of-the-employer as § 119 requires. 
V. Conclusion 
The companies have the burden of establishing that an 
exclusion applies for their employees to avoid tax liability.249 The 
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preceding analysis demonstrates that neither § 132(e) nor § 119 
applies to the free meal programs offered by Google, Facebook, 
and the other Silicon Valley companies.250  
Even if the statutory language clearly requires employees to 
pay tax on the meals, some proponents believe that policy reasons 
justify not paying tax. They argue that free meals encourage 
increased interaction and collaboration between employees.251 
Others say that the free food contributes to an environment that 
maximizes employee comfort.252 Regardless of the policy 
reasoning behind these benefits, the Tax Code remains clear 
about the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine. No exclusion 
applies, so the free meals constitute gross income. Additionally, 
different policy reasoning also justifies assessing taxes on the 
meals. Tax-free compensation for these tech companies creates 
market inefficiency, allowing employees in the tech sector to 
receive more compensation than similarly situated employees in 
another sector. This creates an inequitable advantage for tech 
companies over others, especially for recruiting talent. In creating 
the Tax Code, Congress specifically attempted to correct this type 
of imbalance to avoid burdening one type of employer over 
another.253 
If the Silicon Valley companies deserve this type of tax 
advantage, Congress should specifically create it. As of now, the 
Tax Code mandates that the employees pay taxes on the free 
meals. If they believe the meals are important, the employers 
could increase cash compensation to those employees in a 
proportionate amount to reflect this increased tax liability. With 
the growing practice of providing free meals to companies, it is 
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important that the IRS takes a clear stand. Indeed, the IRS 
recently stated that it aims to release guidance on employer-
provided meals at some point in 2015.254 This Note seeks to begin 
a conversation about these practices to further develop equitable 
application of the Tax Code. 
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